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Earnings quality is of great concern to corporate stakeholders, including capital providers in 
international markets with widely varying regulatory pedigrees and ownership patterns. The 
current study examines the association between the cost of equity capital and earnings quality, 
contextualised via tests that incorporate the potential for moderating effects around institutional 
settings. The analysis focuses on and compares evidence relating to (common law) UK/US firms 
and (civil law) German firms over the period 2005-2018 and seeks to identify whether, given 
institutional dissimilarities, significant differences exist between the two settings. Consistent with 
theoretical reasoning and prior empirical analyses we find a statistically negative association 
between earnings quality, evidenced by information relating to accruals, and the cost of equity 
capital. However, when we extend the analysis by investigating the combined effect of institutional 
ownership and earnings quality on financing cost, the impact - while negative overall - is found to 
vary across legal backdrops. The results are shown to provide potentially important insights for 
policymakers, creditors and investors about the consequences of earnings quality variability. The 
results should be of interest to firms seeking to reduce their financing costs and retain financial 
viability in the wake of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The findings are robust to alternative 
econometric specifications and alternative measures for both earnings quality and the cost of equity 
capital. 





Corporate reporting is critical for the functioning of capital markets as an efficient allocator of 
scarce investment resources (Healy and Palepu, 2001), reducing the extent of principal-agent 
information asymmetry and thereby improving firm liquidity whilst lowering the cost of financing 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Agency conflicts necessitate high quality financial reporting in 
order that “suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) and the extant literature indicates that a reduction 
in information asymmetry enables investors to perform more robust monitoring of managerial 
activities (see, Lee et al., 2008; El-Helaly, 2016; Hao et al., 2019; Liu and Lee, 2019). Investors 
with access to the information thus drive reductions in the cost of capital, although uninformed 
investors will continue to face non-diversifiable information risk, priced through higher expected 
returns (Easley and O’Hara, 2004). Francis et al. (2004) suggest that “poor-quality reporting 
impairs the coordination between firms and their investors with respect to the firm’s capital 
investment decisions and thereby creates information risk. Anticipating this, investors demand a 
higher risk premium; that is, they charge a higher cost of capital” (p. 971). By implication, high 
quality reporting should improve communication flows between firms and their investors, 
ultimately resulting in a reduction in the cost of financing. 
It is also widely accepted that accounting information and reporting practices are shaped by a 
number of external factors, including extant legal systems and traditions, in particular the common 
law - civil law distinction. A large literature suggests that differences in the latter impact on 
accounting practices (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Ball et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002; Ball, 2006), 
with common law countries (i.e., those where the law is customarily established on an un-written 
basis by precedent and finance is dominated by dispersed shareholdings, typically in the English-
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speaking world) generally found to have more transparent accounting systems, stronger investor 
protection mechanisms and more robust corporate governance practices than do civil law nations 
(i.e. those where codification of laws and statutes is the norm, along with significant debt holdings 
and block ownership of equity). However, empirical evidence examining the association between 
earnings quality and the cost of equity capital is mostly US-based (e.g., Francis et al., 2004, 2005; 
Verdi, 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 2011), potentially limiting the generalisability of the findings, 
particularly to civil law countries. The current study investigates the moderating role of a country’s 
legal system on the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital to identify 
the extent to which the latter relationship is influenced by a regulatory base. 
It is now generally acknowledged that institutional shareholders have incentives to become well 
informed about their investee firms and play an active role in monitoring and curbing managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Pound, 1988, Velury and Jenkins, 2006). 
Such investors are usually considered to be capable of analysing financial reports more 
comprehensively and competently than are individual investors (Lemma et al., 2018), in turn 
helping to alleviate the information asymmetry problem and thereby reducing the cost of financing. 
Prior evidence indicates that institutional ownership can positively affect earnings quality 
(Rajgopal et al., 2002; Velury and Jenkins, 2006), firms’ financial strength (Chung et al., 2015), 
dividend pay-out levels (Crane et al., 2016), and performance sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003). Hence, we posit that institutional ownership can reduce the cost of capital, whether directly 
- via a firm’s ability to increase the scale of its investment programmes and attracting investors by 
making generous dividends - or indirectly, by enhancing the quality of earnings.  
To assess the empirical efficacy of this suggestion, we study the impact of institutional ownership 
on the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital using cross-country data 
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for a sample of 948 listed companies from the US, the UK, and Germany over the period 2005 to 
2018. The analysis focuses on the extent to which favourable values for earnings quality are 
rewarded in the form of a lower cost of equity capital whilst exploring the moderating role of 
institutional investor ownership (IOW) and legal system origins in this association. This approach 
provides a number of contributions to the literature in the area. First, the study enriches the growing 
body of research on the economic consequences of earnings quality in equity markets and its 
influence on the cost of equity capital. As noted previously, most previous work in this area focuses 
on a single country (typically the US), which limits the universality of the evidence presented 
(Francis et al., 2004, 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Eliwa et al., 2016). We instead examine the issue 
across nations with different institutional settings, i.e., both those with common law legal 
backgrounds (in this case, the US, and the UK) and those with a codified civil-law system (here, 
Germany). Indeed, researchers have generally overlooked the importance of such contextualising 
factors when examining issues relating to earnings quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2004, 2005; Gray 
et al., 2009).i La Porta et al. (2000) argue that effective legal systems and sound governance factors 
empower shareholders to force insiders to adopt a higher level of earnings quality, while Zhong et 
al. (2017) note that country-level institutional settings impact appreciably on earnings quality.ii In 
keeping with the latter evidence, Leuz et al. (2003) document a positive relationship between 
earnings quality and investor protection at a country level, and we argue here that the strength of 
such regimes impacts directly on the nature of associations between earnings quality and the cost 
of equity capital. In this context, Palepu et al (2019) observes that many countries in mainland 
Europe have been moving towards a model whereby investors’ rights are becoming more 
prominent and stock exchanges are growing in importance. However, the work of La Porta et al. 
from the late 1990s and the early 2000s placed Germany within the Civil Law tradition where 
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capital providers’ protections are relatively weak, with Gonzalez et al. (2020) actually suggesting 
that creditor rights in the nation have weakened over the period covered by the present study. In 
addition, in terms of the ratio of Market Capitalization to GDP German stock exchanges remain 
much less significant than in the US and the UK with a figure of 54.3% in 2019 compared to 107% 
for the UK and 164.8% for the US (CEIC data). Further, the number of listed companies in 
Germany in 2020 (over 450) is much smaller than the number in the UK (over 1800) and the US 
(over 4500) (World Bank, 2020), while ownership concentration in Germany remains much 
greater than in the other two nations investigated here (De La Cruz et al., 2019). Thus, comparison 
of evidence relating to Germany with that pertaining to the US and the UK should allow some 
meaningful conclusions to be drawn about the impact of regime type on the findings. Second, we 
test a conditional hypothesis that proposes that the impact of earnings quality on the cost of equity 
capital is greater among firms with a sizeable proportion of institutional equity ownership. In this 
regard, the extant literature indicates that institutional ownership can enhance earnings quality by 
mitigating against any incentive to manage earnings. As institutional investors have significant 
expertise in monitoring their investee firms - often through robust analysis of company financial 
statements - they can monitor management and ultimately improve investment efficiency and 
reduce financing costs (Pound, 1988; Rajgopal et al., 2002, Chung et al., 2015). Third, we explore 
the extent to which the combined impact of institutional ownership and earnings quality on cost of 
equity differs in common law and civil law countries. Given the relatively entrenched nature of 
large blockholdings in governance systems in the latter relative to the former, with the active 
monitoring role played by these owners reduced (LaPorta et al., 1997; 2000), we would expect the 
effect to be lower in the US and the UK than in Germany. 
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The empirical analysis generates a number of key findings. First, it finds a statistically negative 
association between accruals quality and the cost of equity capital, suggesting that firms with 
higher levels of accrual quality (lower levels of earnings management) enjoy lower financing costs, 
while firms with poor accrual quality suffer from higher costs of finance. iii This finding extends 
the single-country results of Eliwa et al. (2016) for the UK firms and Francis et al. (2006) for the 
US, whereby both reported that the cost of equity capital is negatively associated with earnings 
quality attributes. Second, in a further increment to the extant literature (particularly Francis et al., 
2016 and Eliwa et al., 2016), we find the effect of institutional ownership to be influential, with a 
significantly positive impact on the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity 
capital, suggesting in turn that institutional ownership can improve firms’ ability to secure cheaper 
funding by virtue of robust monitoring. While this result holds for the whole sample (the US, the 
UK and Germany), country-level analysis shows that the result holds only for the common law 
countries (the UK and the US) and not for Germany, consistent with the notion that extant legal 
systems are a determining factor in this context. This novel findingiv points to a role for institutional 
investors in monitoring and influencing the quality of financial reports that are valued by the 
market in its price formation activity. The reported results should have practical implications for 
all interested parties including reporting companies, investors and governments as well as standard 
setters tasked with developing high quality accounting standards that will enhance the quality of 
earnings thereby generating reductions in the cost of finance that are likely to be  particularly 
valuable in the post-pandemic period. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 sets out the research design process. Section 4 then 
8 
presents and discusses the results, while Section 5 concludes the paper, discussing the policy 
implications of the findings and suggesting avenues for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Earnings Quality and the Cost of Equity Capital 
The relationship between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital is based on a theoretical 
foundation which assumes that information risk is priced as a result of either: (i) the asymmetric 
information between informed and uninformed investors (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2012); or (ii) variation in the level of information precision that is published by firms 
(Lambert et al., 2007). In support of this contention, prior research suggests that a high level of 
earnings quality can significantly reduce the cost of equity capital (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Verdi, 
2006; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009; McInnis, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2011; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2012; Ogneva, 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013; Eliwa et al., 2016). Francis et al. 
(2004) report one of the first investigations of the association between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital, using a sample of US firms over the period of 1975-2001 and seven attributes 
of earnings within two bundles. The first bundle consists of four accounting-based attributes of 
earnings quality: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness, while the second 
comprises three market-based attributes: value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. The results 
indicate a significant association between earnings quality measures (examined separately) and the 
cost of equity capital. In particular, the findings suggest that firms with the least favourable values 
of each attribute face higher costs of capital than their counterparts with the most favourable 
values. The study also reports that accounting-based attributes, particularly accrual quality, explain 
most of the variation in the cost of equity capital. Lee et al. (2008) examines the association 
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between IFRS adoption and the cost of equity capital across 17 European countries. The results 
demonstrate a significant reduction in the cost of equity capital following the implementation of 
IFRS, and so accounting framework is incorporated within our analysis.v Similar evidence is 
provided for Australia by Gray et al. (2009), who investigate the relationship between accruals 
quality and the cost of equity capital,vi while Ng (2011) expands the scope of the work in this area 
by investigating the effects of information quality on the cost of equity capital (via changes in 
liquidity risk) over the period 1983 to 2008 using a sample of data for NASDAQ-quoted firms. 
The findings illustrate that higher information quality is, as predicted, linked to lower liquidity 
risk, in turn lowering financing costs. Recently, a UK study by Eliwa et al. (2016) examines the 
relationship between earnings quality and the cost of equity during the period 2005-2011. The 
study employs four proxies for earnings quality: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, and earnings smoothness and reports a significant negative association between 
each of the four proxies considered and the cost of equity capital with earnings predictability 
having the largest impact. 
Given the theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence indicative of a negative association 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital, the current study posits that the presence 
of high-quality earnings negatively affects the cost of equity capital and the first hypothesis we 
propose is therefore: 
H1. Earnings quality is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. 
 
2.2 Earnings Quality, Institutional Ownership and the Cost of Equity Capital 
It has been argued that the separation between ownership and control may motivate managers to 
focus on empire building (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, 
owners need to hold managers accountable for their investment decisions to ensure that they are 
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acting in the best interest of shareholders. It is also widely accepted that the presence of 
institutional investors may mitigate the extent of opportunistic managerial behaviour by virtue of 
the former’s monitoring abilities (WSJ, 1996; Velury and Jenkins, 2006). According to the active 
monitoring hypothesis, the amount of wealth invested provides institutional owners with a strong 
motivation to manage their investment actively (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). In contrast, minority 
shareholders may be reluctant to exercise their rights to monitor managers, as the costs involved 
may exceed any potential benefits that accrue, resulting in a “free rider” problem among investors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this context, Stiglitz (1985) suggests that concentrated ownership 
is likely to be associated with a higher level of attention being paid to the managerial effort, as 
scrutiny by institutional investors is likely to curtail managerial deviations from (shareholder 
wealth) optimising behaviour.  
 
Consistent with this reasoning, prior empirical literature suggests that earnings management is less 
common in firms with a higher proportion of institutional investors (Mitra and Cready, 2005). 
Observed practised therefore accords with a scenario whereby institutional investors have the 
expertise to analyse financial statements meaningfully, thereby encouraging managers to produce 
the type of high quality report that reduces information asymmetry and lowers the cost of equity 
capital (Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 2004; 2005; Velury and Jenkins, 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 
2013; Hsieh et al., 2019). Velury and Jenkins (2006) investigate the association between the level 
of institutional ownership and earnings quality for a sample of US firms for the period 1992-1999, 
using four proxy measures: predictive value, neutrality, timeliness, and faithful representation. The 
results demonstrate a significantly positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
earnings quality.vii A more recent study of firm-level data for 41 different countries by Zhong et 
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al. (2017) points to a similar link between institutional ownership and earnings quality, whilst 
Lemma et al. (2018) uncover evidence, again identifiable across a large number of countries, of a 
relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management. Finally, Hsieh et al. 
(2019) examine the effect of institutional ownership on the link between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital using data for 64 listed firms in Taiwan, covering the period 2000-2017. The 
results reveal significant variations in the nature of the relationship between earnings quality and 
cost of finance, with high levels of institutional ownership weakening the negative link between 
the two. This pattern is attributed to the monitoring/free-riding effects alluded to earlier,viii and the 
current study therefore posits that: 
H2: The combined effect of institutional ownership and earnings quality reduces the 
cost of equity capital. 
 
 
2.3 Earnings Quality, Legal System and the Cost of Equity Capital 
The extant literature argues that the accounting regime and the legal system are fundamental 
influences on a country’s institutional background (La Porta et al., 1998; Ball, 2006). Indeed, La 
Porta et al. (1998) have indicated that a country’s legal system shapes the country’s accounting 
system, with common law countries purported to have more transparent accounting systems, 
stronger investor protection, and more robust corporate governance practices than their civil law 
counterparts. Similarly, Ball et al. (2000) suggest that, relative to the latter, common law countries 
are characterised by active stock exchanges, a diversified base of investors, higher investor 
protection, high litigation risk, and a focus on shareholder primacy. In line with this reasoning, 
empirical research supports the contention that low earnings quality is more prevalent in civil-law 
countries (Coppens and Peek, 2005; Daske et al., 2006). Similarly, Bushman et al. (2006) provide 
evidence that firms in common law countries reflect bad news in reported earnings on a timelier 
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basis than do those in civil law countries.ix In this context, a number of studies suggest that the 
potential monitoring role of large block holders is reduced when debt traditionally represents a 
high proportion of total financing and where large ownership stakes exist, these tend to have been 
in place for many years, with close links to management common (LaPorta et al., 1997; 2000; 
2006; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). As the latter features tend to be more common in civil law than 
common law countries, we argue that the strength of the country’s legal system impacts on the 
combined impact of institutional ownership and earnings quality on the cost of equity capital, and 
develop the third hypothesis on this basis: 
H3. The combined impact of institutional ownership and earnings quality on the cost of 




3. Research Design 
3.1 Data and Sample 
The sample for the present paper consists of non-financial companies included in major stock 
indices in each of the three different countries investigated; the S&P 500 (for the US), the FTSE 
350 (the UK), and the CDAX Open-Composite (Germany). As noted earlier, whilst most prior 
studies in the area focus on single countries, a number of studies have explored issues relating to 
governance and cost of capital across wide geographic spans (e.g., Persakis and Iatridis, 2017). 
However, there is growing evidence that levels of national development and market maturity 
impact on equity and other financing costs (Baker and Wurgler, 2015; Neibel, 2018), and so in the 
present study, we focus on markets with long histories of supporting international capital in nations 
defined by high levels of economic development. Data for a total of 1,275 companies were initially 
sought on this basis, but 327 had to be excluded as a result of the exclusion of financial firms and 
firms with incomplete or missing data.x The final sample, therefore, comprised 948 firms: 401 
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listed in the US, 215 listed in the UK, and 332 listed in Germany between 2005 and 2018, as 
detailed in Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
3.2 Model Specification and Measurement of Variables 
3.2.1 The cost of equity capital  
Prior studies identify two approaches to measure the cost of equity capital (CoEC); the ex-ante 
approach, which is based on analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2006; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Eliwa et al., 2016; Ahmed et al. 2019) and the ex-post approach, which is based 
on realised returns. The current study uses the former in the main analysis. The latter approach is 
used as a robustness proxy for CoEC, where measures the CoEC as the earnings–price ratio of a 
firm minus the median earnings–price ratio of its industry (IndEP). For the ex-ante measure, we 
extract analysts’ forecast data as recorded in June in the IBES Database for sample firms. We 
remove firms with negative two years ahead consensus earnings forecasts and have negative long-
term growth forecasts from our sample. Our ex-ante measure (𝐶𝑜𝐸𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁) is based on the average 
of three ex-ante measures to decrease the measurement errors (Hail and Leuz, 2006). Figure 1 
outlines our proxy for the 𝐶𝑜𝐸𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁  including (i) the price-earnings-growth ratio measure (𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺) 
(Easton, 2004); (ii) the modified price-earnings growth ratio measure (Easton, 2004) (𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺); and 
(iii) the modified economy-wide growth measure (Gode and Mohanram, 2003) (𝑟𝐺𝑀).  
3.2.2 Earnings Quality (EQ) Measures 
There is no generally accepted measure for earnings quality. Rahman et al. (2010) argue that 
accrual measures can inform shareholders about cash flow potential as they incorporate 
assumptions about future inflows and outflows, while Callen and Segal (2004) suggest that 
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accruals enhance current stock returns and are therefore inherently value-relevant on this basis. 
Accrual-based variables provide a range of informative perceptions about earnings quality (Francis 
et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010) by emphasising the extent to which accrual-related accounts 
match with cash flows from operations for the previous, last, current, and next period (Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002). A significant relationship between accruals and cash flow from operations indicates 
high earnings quality. 
A number of models have been used to measure accruals quality, including Jones (1991), Kasznik 
(1999), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et al. (2005); Kothari et al. (2005), and McNichols 
and Stubben (2008). To reflect the broad approach used in the prior research, four measures of 
accruals - based on modified versions of the Jones (1991) model - are employed here: (i) the 
Kasznik (1999) model; (ii) the model of discretionary revenues developed by McNichols and 
Stubben (2008) and Stubben (2010); (iii) the cross-sectional model designed by Francis et al. 
(2005); and (iv) the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model developed by Kothari et 
al. (2005). Our choice is based on two rationales. First, the current examination involves data from 
three countries; hence, simple models may facilitate a larger sample frame and minimise the impact 
of inconsistencies in the measurement of earnings quality. Second, these variants of the Jones 
(1991) model of accruals permit the accounting policy and practice choices of a company to be 
estimated, as they are broad enough to capture the impact of institutional influences on accounting 
practices within a firm (Rahman et al., 2010). Indeed, Haw et al. (2004) argue that these modified 
Jones’ models capture the tendency of insiders to either overstate reported earnings in order to 
conceal resource diversion or understate earnings in years of enhanced performance to cultivate 
reserves in case of future financial difficulties. Consistent with the prior research, the present study 
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uses the cross-sectional accrual quality model of Dechow and Dichev (2002), as modified by 
McNichols (2002), and Francis et al. (2005) and presented in Equation 1: 
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝟏  
 
where: 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 represents working capital accruals, computed as the change in non-liquid current 
assets, less the change in current liabilities, plus the change in short-term debts. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡,
𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 signifies lagged, current, and future cash flow from operations. All variables are scaled 
by lagged total assets. Earnings quality (EQ) is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals 
of Equation (1), calculated over year t-4 to t. Large standard deviations of residuals indicate poor 
accruals quality. Equation (1) is estimated for each industry with at least 15 firms in year t. In this 
regard, if a firm has steadily high residuals for a period of time, the standard deviation of these 
residuals will be small; therefore, the firm will enjoy comparatively high accruals quality as a 
result of lower uncertainty about its accruals (See Eliwa et al., 2016). 
 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
The relationship between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital is analysed on the basis of 
holding all other explanatory variables constant. Prior research in this field typically uses four such 
controls: firm size (Size), market beta (Beta), leverage (Leverage), and growth (Growth) (see, e.g., 
Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009, Eliwa, et al., 2016). Size is measured as 
the logarithm of total assets in year t, while Beta is based on the Capital Assets Pricing Model 
(CAPM) using 60 months data. Leverage is quantified as total debt deflated by total assets in year 
t, and Growth is computed as the logarithm of 1 plus the percentage change in equity compared to 
the previous year (Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009). According to prior 
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studies’ findings, we anticipate a positive relationship between the cost of equity capital and Beta 
and Leverage, while we expect to see a negative association with Size and Growth.  
3.2.4 Institutional Ownership Measurement 
Following Sun et al. (2018), we define institutional ownership (IOW) as the percentage of equity 
held by institutional investors (investment banks or institutions) who own more than 5% of a firm’s 
issued shares.xi 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 outlines descriptive statistics for each of the variables, including earnings quality 
measures, the cost of equity capital proxies, and the controls. The mean of EQ ranges from 0.055 
and 0.318, within the span reported by prior studies in the area, including Kothari et al. (2005). 
Means of 0.115 and -0.055 are recorded for CoEC and IndEP, respectively, again consistent with 
earlier evidence (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Eliwa et al., 2016). Table 2 provides a descriptive 
analysis for data relating to the control variables with Growth, Leverage, Beta, and Size generating 
means of 1.88, 0.228, 0.940, and 14.50, respectively. Table 3 indicates the correlation coefficients 
calculated for the variables used in the main investigation. Whilst the data indicates a positive and 
significant correlation among all independent variables, the coefficients are all below 0.4.xii More 
generally, Table 3 outlines a positive and a significant correlation between CoEC and earnings 
quality, which indicates a negative correlation between the two said variables. 




 4.2 Regression Results 
This section outlines the results of examining the relationship between CoEC and EQ. Prior to 
performing this examination, we first test the association between the CoEC and risk factors 
(Equation 2) employed by prior research including firm size (Size), market beta (Beta), leverage 
(Leverage), and growth (Growth) (see, e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 
2009, Eliwa, et al., 2016). The association between CoEC and EQ is then examined via Equation 
3. We used a clustered standard error pooled regression by country and industry to control for 
cross-sectional correlation (Frankel et al., 2011). Year dummies were also included to control for 
time-series correlation. 
CoECi,t = β0 + β1Risk Factors (controls)i,t + ∑ Industry + ∑ Country + ∑ Year + εi,t 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝟐 
 
CoECi,t = β0 + β1EQi,t + β2Risk Factors (controls)i,t + ∑ Industry + ∑ Country + ∑ Year
+ εi,t 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝟑 
 
Panel A of Table 4 (Equation 2) details the results from the base model examining the relationship 
between the risk factors (the controls) and CoEC. The evidence appears to validate the CoEC 
estimation procedure adopted in the study. As expected, we find that the cost of equity is positively 
related to market beta (i.e., companies with a higher value of the latter have a higher cost of equity) 
and negatively related to firm size (i.e., small firms have a higher cost of equity). The mean 
coefficient on these variables is consistent with the relationships reported in Panel A of Table 4. 
In particular, Beta generates a coefficient of 0.01 and a p-value of less than 0.01, suggesting that 
an average implied market risk premium of 1 percent of the sample is similar in magnitude to the 
historical market risk premium used in previous studies. Size has a significant negative coefficient 
in the base models indicating that large stocks have smaller expected returns. In contrast, the results 
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reveal that Growth and Leverage both have a significant positive influence on CoEC, thus 
confirming that the evidence here is broadly in line with the pioneering work of Francis et al. 
(2005) and implying that the current study’s base model is valid in terms of its employment in the 
next stage of the analysis. 
Panel B of Table 4 (Equation 3) outlines the results of the first examination of the relationship 
between CoEC and EQ, reporting a statistically positive link between the two variables with a 
coefficient of 0.067 and a p-value of less than 0.01. As EQ is measured as the standard deviation 
of residuals from equation 1, this piece of evidence suggests that a rise in the level of earnings 
management (i.e. lower EQ) leads to a rise in the cost of equity capital, whilst high earnings quality 
can lower CoEC. In addition, Panel B of Table 4 notes an adjusted-R2 value of 0.182, suggesting 
that earnings quality explains more than 18% of the variation in CoEC, compared to only 15.1% 
in the base model. Overall, the evidence in Table 4 provides support for hypothesis H1. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Table 5 outlines the empirical results relating to the combined role of institutional ownership and 
earnings quality on CoEC generated on the basis of Equation 4:  
CoECi,t = β0 + β1EQi,t + β2IOWi,t + β3EQ ∗ IOWi,t + β4Controlsi,t + ∑ Industry + ∑ Country + ∑ year + εi,t  
Equation 4 
Inspection of Panel A of Table 5 reveals that the interaction between EQ and IOW (EQ*IOW) is 
negatively and significantly related to CoEC, with the coefficient of -0.094 (and related p-value of 
0.01) suggesting that IOW plays an important role for the sample as a whole in terms of market 
participants’ appraisal of the risk associated with share ownership. These results support 
hypothesis H2 and, in so doing, imply that institutional investors are capable monitors of earnings 
quality. In this regard, Bushee (1998) indicates that institutional monitoring is facilitated through 
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corporate governance processes that emphasise the importance of information relating to 
managerial decisions. Hence, when the level of IOW is sufficiently high, vigorous monitoring 
motivates managers to provide quality earnings (Gillan and Starks, 1998; Chung et al., 2002). 
Panel B of Table 5 (based on Equation 4) provides evidence regarding the impact of any interaction 
between IOW and EQ on the CoEC across the three countries included in the study’s sample frame. 
As noted earlier, this analysis permits the identification of differences in the effect of IOW in 
common law and civil law settings. The results from Panel B of Table 5 demonstrate variability in 
the outcomes on this basis. Although EQ is positive in all cases (significant in two) and IOW – on 
its own – is insignificant in all cases, the interaction variable IOW*EQ (consistent with hypothesis 
H3) has a negative relationship with the cost of equity capital in both the US and the UK, but plays 
no role in Germany. This result suggests that in nations with robust regulatory systems and well-
diversified and large (proportionally) share-based financing, large institutional shareholdings and 
earnings quality work together to reduce the CoEC and vice-versa. In Germany, this combined 
role does not manifest itself in our data, with the interaction between institutional ownership and 
earnings quality having no impact over and above the effect of the latter on its own. By implication, 
where institutions dominate in terms of ownership and control, with many of the blockholdings 
persisting for decades (LaPorta et al., 1997; 2000) their monitoring role is less effective, and 
market reliance on earnings quality remains strong. As discussed above, the US and the UK share 
some key features in institutional settings relating both to legal system origin and shareholder 
ownership, whereas traditions and patterns in Germany in both these regards differ markedly. The 
results in Table 5 are consistent with extant literature in this area, where it is argued that legal 
system and governance customs are important influences on a country’s institutional background 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Ball, 2006 (Coppens and Peek, 2005; Ball, 2006; Bushman et al., 2006; 
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Daske et al., 2006). Our evidence extends this body of work by identifying a clear difference in 
the role played by large blockholdings on the relationship between earnings quality and cost of 
equity across nations with differing institutional traditions. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
4.3 Robustness Analysis 
The analysis included some sensitivity tests of the main regressions. First, we use the industry-
adjusted earnings price ratio (IndEP) as an alternative measure of the cost of equity capital. In this 
case, IndEP is defined as the earnings-price ratio of a firm less the median earnings price ratio for 
its industry. To this end Equation 5 is employed, as in Eliwa et al. (2016):  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑃i,t = β0 + β1EQi,t + β2IOWi,t + β3EQ ∗ IOWi,t + β4Controlsi,t + ∑ Industry + ∑ Country + ∑ year + εi,t  
Equation 5 
The results based on this measure are reported in Table 6 (Equation 5). A comparison between the 
results of Tables 4 and 5 (based on the implied CoEC) and those reported in Table 6 (based on 
IndEP) indicates the confirmatory nature of the latter findings. In particular, Panel A of Table 6 
reports a positive and significant relationship between IndEP and earnings quality with a 
coefficient of 0.86 and a p-value of less than 0.05, suggesting that earnings quality matters in the 
determination of financing costs. Panel B of Table 6 indicates a strong negative relationship 
between IndEP on the one hand and the interaction between earnings quality and institutional 
ownership on the other, pointing to the role of contextualising factors in affecting the cost of equity 
capital. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
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Finally, we perform a robustness analysis for EQ, on the basis of the performance-adjusted 
measure of earnings quality developed by Kothari et al. (2005) from Jones (1991)’s formulation: 
 
𝐾𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡=𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
) +𝛽2∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 6 
 
where 𝐾𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets less the change 
in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, less the depreciation and amortisation expenses for firm 
i in year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the return on assets computed as net income 
divided by lagged total assets. The absolute value of residuals from Equation 6 is employed as 
another EQ measure (as in Kothari et al., 2005) and used in Equation 7 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐸𝐶i,t = β0 + β1𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑄 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + β4Controlsi,t + ∑ Industry + ∑ Country + ∑ year +
εi,t    𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 7  
 
The results are reported in Table 7. Inspection of the latter indicates consistency with the reported 
in Tables 4 and 5. In particular, Panel A of Table 7 reports a significant positive relationship 
between CoEC and earnings quality with a coefficient of 0.03 and a p-value of less than 0.01, 
while Panel B Table 7 indicates a negative relationship between CoEC and the interaction between 
earnings quality and institutional ownership.  





5. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study has provided novel empirical evidence regarding the association between the cost of 
equity capital and earnings quality for a cross-country (the US, the UK and Germany) sample of 
non–financial firms between 2005 and 2018. Drawing on prior research, we estimate two earnings 
quality measures and four proxies for the cost of equity capital as well as a set of four control 
variables. The results indicate a statistically positive association between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital; firms with higher levels of earnings quality enjoy lower levels of financing 
costs and vice versa. The findings have been shown to be robust to changes in the definition of 
both financing costs and earnings quality. Importantly, while we also report a significant combined 
role for institutional ownership and earnings quality on the cost of capital, this is found to exist 
only for the two common law nations in the sample, and not for Germany. This result is argued to 
be indicative of market recognition that the positive benefits of institutional owners’ monitoring 
are tempered by the agency issues arising at the levels found in many civil law contexts. 
The results are of potential importance for a number of parties. In particular, they suggest that 
market participants are relatively sophisticated in terms of the processes driving financing costs, 
with mechanisms differing according to regulatory and governance customs. Awareness of this 
subtlety in market outcomes is likely to be valuable for policymakers, creditors, investors, and all 
those with interest in understanding the determinants of equity capital costs for listed firms, 
especially following the Covid-19 pandemic which is having a catastrophic impact on companies’ 
financial performance and their abilities to remain solvent. We fully acknowledge that the study 
has a number of limitations. First, this paper employs institutional ownership as a mediating 
variable in the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital, but this is not 
intended to suggest that it is the only measures of relevance in this context and additional research 
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might usefully expand the analysis to incorporate other forms of ownership including state and 
foreign bases. Second, and suggestive of another avenue for developing the work presented in the 
study, we have used accrual measures of earnings quality. Again, this is not designed to represent 
a definitive proxy for the latter, and future research could explore the extent to which the measure 
employed captures the notion of quality as perceived by market participants themselves. More 
generally, considering the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic for financial markets all over 
the world, future research might usefully investigate how this pandemic could impact firm 
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 Table 1: Industry and Country Analysis 
 Sector   Country  Total  
 US UK Germany 
Information Technology 49 18 70 137 
Utilities 26 8 11 45 
Health care 50 14 37 101 
Telecommunications  4 5 7 16 
Manufacturing  75 42 73 190 
Services 113 98 98 309 
Material 2 4 26 32 
Food and beverage  52 20 8 80 
Energy  30 6 2 38 
Total firms 401 215 332 948 
Total observations  5,614 3,010 4,648 13,272 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 0.250 Medan 0.750 
CoEC 0.115 0.0785 0.0796 0.0966 0.126 
IndEP -0.0549 0.991 -0.117 0 0.0820 
Growth 1.887 1.014 1.100 1.916 2.599 
Leverage 0.228 0.181 0.0875 0.211 0.329 
Beta 0.940 0.571 0.550 0.881 1.250 
Size 14.50 2.458 12.91 14.84 16.29 
IOW 0.594 0.491 0 1 1 
EQ (Francis et al. 2005 model) 0.0618 0.0589 0.0257 0.0439 0.0773 
EQ2(Kothari et al. 2005 model) 0.173 0.188 0.0484 0.110 0.231 
  
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics about variables employed in the study. CoEC refers to the cost of equity 
capital which is measured as the mean of three ex-ante proxies: the price-earnings-growth model; the modified price-
earnings growth model (Easton, 2004); and the modified economy-wide growth model. IndEP refers to the earnings–
price (EP) ratio of a firm minus the EP for its industry; Market Beta (Beta) is calculated based on 60-rolling monthly 
date acquired from firm-specific CAPM estimations; Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets of firm 
i in year t; Growth is measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the percentage change in equity compared to previous 
year; Leverage is measured based on total debt deflated by total assets of a firm i in year t. IOW indicates the 
percentage of institutional ownership held as part of stakes greater than 5%. EQ refers to earnings quality measured 
based on a cross-sectional accrual quality model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) modified by McNichols (2002) and 
Francis et al. (2005). EQ2 refers to earnings quality based on the performance-adjusted measure of earnings quality 
developed by Kothari et al. (2005). 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
 CoEC Growth Leverage Beta Size IOW 
CoEC 1      
Growth 0.0601 1     
 <0.0001      
Leverage 0.0152 0.0604 1    
 0.109 <0.0001     
Beta 0.0501 0.0318 0.0138 1   
 <0.0001 0.0011 0.1425    
Size -0.3246 0.322 0.2142 0.1824 1  
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001   
IOW -0.07 -0.0556 0.0457 0.0656 -0.0184 1 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0225  
EQ 0.1425 -0.1787 -0.1499 0.0106 -0.3077 -0.0122 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.3881 <0.0001 0.2629 






Table 4: The Relationship between the Cost of Equity Capital and Earnings Quality  
 
Variables Panel A: Base Model Panel B: EQ Model 






















N 5648 5648 
adj. R2 0.151 0.182 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No 
Note: This table details results relating to equations 2 and 3, examining the relationship between CoEC and the risk 
factors (Panel A). It also outlines the results of the model examining the relationship between CoEC and EQ (Panel 






Table 5: The Combined Effect of Institutional Ownership and Earnings Quality on Cost of 
Equity Capital 
 
Variables Panel A: Institutional 
Ownership Effect 
Panel B: Country Level Analysis 
US UK Germany 
Growth 0.013*** 0.0066*** 0.0052* 0.019*** 
 (10.1) (4.31) (1.79) (7.90) 
Leverage 0.066*** 0.040*** -0.0077 0.12*** 
 (10.6) (5.99) (-0.66) (8.72) 
Beta 0.010*** 0.014*** -0.0022 0.032*** 
 (5.28) (6.39) (-0.67) (6.51) 
Size -0.012*** 0.0025** -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 (-18.7) (2.57) (-7.78) (-14.5) 
EQ 0.12*** 0.044** 0.10 0.17*** 
 (4.33) (2.12) (1.41) (4.01) 
IOW 0.0054* 0.0038 0.0082 -0.0014 
 (1.80) (1.17) (1.43) (-0.22) 
IOW*EQ -0.094*** -0.014* -0.067* 0.0087 
 (-2.62) (-1.69) (-1.82) (0.13) 
Constant 0.25*** 0.042** 0.21*** 0.25*** 
 (26.2) (2.43) (11.2) (13.1) 
N 5648 1921 1752 1975 
adj. R2 0.183 0.152 0.156 0.198 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports results relating to equation 4, testing the role of institutional ownership for the whole sample 
(Panel A: IOW*EQ) and for a country-level analysis (Panel B) in mediating the relationship between CoEC and EQ. A 




















Table 6: The Relationship between Industry-Adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio and Earnings 
Quality 
 
Variables Panel A: CoEC and EQ Panel B: CoEC and EQ*IOW 
 IndEP IndEP 
Growth -0.026 -0.025 
 (-1.04) (-0.99) 
Leverage 0.088 0.079 
 (0.74) (0.66) 
Beta 0.060 0.058 
 (1.64) (1.59) 
Size -0.00074 -0.0013 
 (-0.058) (-0.10) 
EQ 0.86** 1.53*** 
 (2.46) (2.94) 
IOW -0.020 -0.089 
 (-0.50) (-1.59) 
IOW*EQ  -1.16* 
  (-1.74) 
Constant 0.069 0.12 
 (0.40) (0.67) 
N 3008 3008 
adj. R2 0.05 0.06 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No 
Note: This table reports results relating to equation 5, testing the relationship between CoEC and risk factors (Panel 
A). It also outlines the results relating to the relationship between CoEC and EQ (Panel B) using an alternative measure 
for the cost of equity capital which is the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the median earnings–price ratio of its 
industry (IndEP). A */**/***indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1%level. IOW = institutional investor ownership.
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Table 7: The Association between Cost of Equity Capital and Earnings Quality on the basis 
of Kothari (2005)’s Estimator 
 
Variables  Panel A: CoEC and EQ Panel B: CoEC and EQ*IOW 
Growth 0.0085*** 0.0086*** 
 (7.73) (7.86) 
Leverage 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (10.6) (10.5) 
Beta 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (9.45) (9.43) 
Size -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-22.2) (-22.1) 
IOW -0.00049 0.0078*** 
 (-0.27) (3.17) 
EQ 0.030*** 0.060*** 
 (5.80) (7.52) 
IOW*EQ  -0.051*** 
  (-4.94) 
Constant 0.27*** 0.26*** 
 (35.0) (34.0) 
N 7,953 7,953 
Adj. R2 0.214 0.216 
Notes: This table reports results to equation 7, testing the role of institutional ownership (Panel A: IOW*EQ) in mediating 
the association between CoEC and EQ using an alternative measure (EQ) for earnings quality based on the performance-
adjusted measure of earnings quality developed by Kothari et al. (2005). A */**/***indicates significance at the 






















Figure 1: Formulas for the implied cost of equity capital models 
Proxy Common name Formula 
𝒓𝑷𝑬𝑮 
Price-earnings 
growth ratio model 
(PEG) (Easton, 
2004) 








𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 = 𝐴 + √𝐴
2 + (𝐸(𝑒𝑝𝑠2) − (𝐸(𝑒𝑝𝑠1))/𝑃0 






















𝑃𝑡 = share price the period t. 
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡= earnings per share at the period t. 
𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡 = dividends per share at the period t. 
𝛾 = the rate of growth in abnormal earnings post forecast horizon. In 
implementing the model, 𝛾 is equal to the risk-free rate less 3%, 
where the 3% represents economy-wide growth. 
𝑪𝒐𝑬𝑪 
The implied 
measure of cost of 
equity capital 






i An exception is represented by Rahmat et al. (2020) who find that although engagement in related party transactions 
by East Asian firms reduces earnings quality (measured via discretionary accruals), the impact can be reduced by 
effective regulation. 
ii For example, earnings are more timely in common law countries than in civil law ones (Ball et al., 2000). 
iii Among a range of earnings quality proxies (including accrual quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, 
earnings smoothness, value relevance, timeliness and conservatism), Francis et al. (2004) indicate that accrual quality 
is the most influential in terms of cost of equity capital. 
iv Robust to a number of alternative econometric specifications and alternative measures for both earnings quality and 
the cost of capital. 
v In this regard, Sun et al. (2011) notes that both the US GAAP and IFRS are considered to be high quality accounting 
frameworks with the implementation of the latter leading to a demonstrable improvement in earnings quality.  
vi Although the results imply that equity costs are most strongly influenced by innate accrual quality and not the 
discretionary component. 
vii Leading the authors to state that “institutional investors have incentives to monitor the quality of earnings and also 
the power to discipline managers who report low quality accounting numbers” (p. 1044). 
viii See also Fidrmuc et al. (2006). 
ix See also Elshandidy et al. (2015) 
x Consistent with many international studies within accounting and finance research (e.g., Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2006; Beck et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2011), data was collected from Thomson-Reuters, DataStream and W/B/E/S. 
xiIOW data was obtained from Thomson-One-Banker. 
xii As Dohoo et al. (1997) and others note, at these levels of association multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem, 
with the danger only becoming severe at scores of 0.9 or above.  
                                                             
